There are compelling reasons why Australia should not recognise a Palestinian State, writes ECAJ co-CEO Peter Wertheim. An edited version of this article appears on ABC Religion and Ethics

Intro­duc­tion
At the ALP State Con­fer­ences in Queens­land and Victoria in June, motions were put forward urging the Aus­trali­an gov­ern­ment to commit itself to a deadline for Australia to recognise a Palestini­an State.  The Victorian State Con­fer­ence resolved that the deadline should be “within the term of this par­lia­ment”.[1] A campaign to achieve this objective has openly been spear-headed by former ALP Foreign Minister Bob Carr. He and his sup­port­ers have declared that they intend to carry this campaign to the floor of the upcoming ALP National Con­fer­ence in Brisbane from 17 to 19 August 2023.[2]

Yet recog­ni­tion cannot create a State where none exists on the ground.  Recog­ni­tion of a State is not an aspir­a­tion­al statement; it is, as the word implies, an acknow­ledge­ment of reality.[3]  It is one thing to opine that a Palestini­an State ought to exist, but another thing entirely to declare that such a State already does exist.

Relevant prin­ciples
Recog­ni­tion of a Palestini­an State, other than as an outcome of a nego­ti­ated peace agreement between Israel and the Palestini­ans, would con­sti­tute a repu­di­ation of the bipar­tis­an principle on which Aus­trali­an policy has been based for several decades:  that Australia should encourage Israel and the Palestini­ans to return to good faith nego­ti­ations on the final status issues of the conflict, which include Palestini­an statehood, and refrain from doing anything to pre-empt the outcome of those nego­ti­ations.  It is a principle that Foreign Minister Penny Wong strongly reaf­firmed in October 2022, as the rationale for reversing Australia’s previous recog­ni­tion of West Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and seat of gov­ern­ment.[4]  Whilst critics of this decision, including the Executive Council of Aus­trali­an Jewry, strongly disagreed that West Jerusalem (as distinct from other parts of Jerusalem) is a final status issue, the principle artic­u­lated by the Foreign Minister was, and is, unim­peach­able.

A second principle that was affirmed by the Foreign Minister at an Estimates hearing in April is that the platform res­ol­u­tion of the ALP National Con­fer­ence in 2021, which called on a Labor gov­ern­ment to recognise a Palestini­an State, is “an expres­sion of the views of the national con­fer­ence”, but that “this is ulti­mately a decision, a matter for gov­ern­ment”.[5]  This last statement would be con­tra­dicted by any future National Con­fer­ence res­ol­u­tion that sets a deadline for the gov­ern­ment to recognise a Palestini­an State.

A third principle, which has also enjoyed decades of bipar­tis­an agreement, is that Australia acts to uphold the rules-based inter­na­tion­al order.  This is for both ethical reasons and reasons of national self-interest.  As regards the question of Palestini­an statehood, even some of the Palestini­ans’ strongest advocates have conceded[6] that there is no Palestini­an entity that comes close to sat­is­fy­ing the inter­na­tion­al legal criteria that define a State, as set out in article 1 of the Mon­tevid­eo Con­ven­tion on the Rights and Duties of States (1933),[7] which is commonly accepted as reflect­ing customary inter­na­tion­al law[8]:

“The state as a person of inter­na­tion­al law should possess the following qual­i­fic­a­tions: (a) a permanent pop­u­la­tion; (b) a defined territory; (c) gov­ern­ment; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”

Whatever may be said of criteria (a) and (b)[9], it is clear that no Palestini­an entity presently satisfies criteria (c) or (d).  There is no central gov­ern­ment authority that exercises control over the territory claimed by the Palestini­ans (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), and which is capable of entering into or ful­filling inter­na­tion­al agree­ments in respect of that territory as a whole.  Hamas, which admin­is­ters the Gaza Strip, has declared publicly that it does not consider itself or the people and territory of Gaza to be bound by any agreement that the Palestini­an Authority may enter into.[10] Similarly, the Palestini­an Authority, which is rapidly losing control over the areas it has admin­istered in the West Bank[11], does not consider itself or the people and territory of the West Bank to be bound by any agreement that Hamas may enter into.

It follows that neither Australia nor any other country, including Israel, could rely on any com­mit­ments that may be made by the Palestini­an Authority or any other entity on behalf of “the State of Palestine” as a whole.  Until that situation is remedied, “the State of Palestine” is a fiction, not a reality. A mature democracy like Australia should not demean itself by extending official recog­ni­tion to a fiction.

Although recog­ni­tion is a political act and a matter of dis­cre­tion, it is non­ethe­less, according to an inter­na­tion­al tribunal, “subject to com­pli­ance with the imper­at­ives of general inter­na­tion­al law.”[12]  Thus, recog­ni­tion by even 138 other States cannot overcome clear and com­pel­ling objective evidence indic­at­ing that the requisite criteria of statehood have not been met, espe­cially as these other States include only a small number of mature demo­cra­cies com­par­able to Australia. Nor is this defect overcome by a UN General Assembly res­ol­u­tion granting non-member observer State status to “Palestine”.[13]  Such res­ol­u­tions are not legally binding on member States.[14]  To make a special exception for the Palestini­ans by waiving inter­na­tion­al norms con­cern­ing statehood and recog­ni­tion as if they were of no con­sequence, would be incom­pat­ible with Australia’s professed adherence to those norms.  One either supports the inter­na­tion­al rule of law as a general principle, or one does not.

Policy con­sid­er­a­tions
There are also good policy reasons why Australia, to date, and its closest allies New Zealand, the US, the UK and Canada, along with almost every other mature democracy in the world, have not recog­nised a Palestini­an State. Nothing has changed recently in the realities of the situation that would inval­id­ate any of these reasons.  If anything, recent events have rein­forced their validity.

1. The internal Palestini­an divide

The internal divide within Palestini­an society between the secular nation­al­ist movement, rep­res­en­ted by the Palestini­an Authority (PA), and the theo­crat­ic movement, rep­res­en­ted by the Islamist organ­isa­tions, Hamas and Palestini­an Islamic Jihad,[15] is perhaps the most powerful obstacle to the achieve­ment of Palestini­an statehood at present. The division is not only ideo­lo­gic­al but also geo­graph­ic. The PA exercises limited control over the West Bank. Hamas has effective control in Gaza. The bitter dif­fer­ences between these two movements have degen­er­ated into interne­cine violence on many occasions.

Rep­res­ent­at­ives of the PA and Hamas have met many times over the years, both directly and through mediators, to try to resolve the fun­da­ment­al dif­fer­ences between them, and to formulate a single vision of the kind of state a State of Palestine would be. All of these attempts have failed. The dif­fer­ences between them appear to be intract­able.

This means that for reasons which are entirely internal to Palestini­an society, there is no reas­on­able prospect for the fore­see­able future that the fatal flaw in the con­ten­tion that “Palestine” is a State will be remedied.

2. The Palestini­an declar­a­tion of statehood in the absence of peace with Israel violates the Oslo Accords

The Israeli-Palestini­an Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (also known as ‘Oslo II’) was entered into by Israel and the PLO in 1995.[16] Oslo II expli­citly provides that the Palestini­an Authority will not have jur­is­dic­tion or control over the external borders of the territory in which it operates (Article XII), its airspace (Article XIII, para 4 of Annex 1), foreign relations (Article IX, para 5), Israeli nationals and set­tle­ments located within the territory of the West Bank and Gaza (Article XII) and elements of internal security and public order (depending on the par­tic­u­lar area involved, Area A, B, or C). The fact that the Palestini­an Authority, by agreement, does not exercise jur­is­dic­tion or control over any of these matters – which are fun­da­ment­al indicia of sov­er­eignty – con­tra­dicts its claims that “Palestine” is a State. 

Oslo II also contains certain pro­vi­sions relating to final status issues. Article XXXI, paragraph 7, provides:

“Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status nego­ti­ations.”

For the Palestini­ans to declare that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are parts of the sovereign territory of a State of Palestine is ipso facto an attempt to “change the status” of those ter­rit­or­ies.  Accord­ingly, any such declar­a­tion also con­sti­tutes a breach by the PLO and PA of that binding com­mit­ment.

It follows that any declar­a­tion of a Palestini­an State, other than as an outcome of a directly-nego­ti­ated agreement with Israel, is a clear violation of Oslo II. Any recog­ni­tion of such a State by par­lia­ments and gov­ern­ments in the inter­na­tion­al community would be complicit in such a breach.[17] It is a generally accepted principle of inter­na­tion­al law that a state may not arise out of an illegal act, as an illegal act cannot produce legal rights – ex injuria non oritur jus.[18]

3. Recog­nising a Palestini­an State would be an incentive to the PA to per­petu­ate, not resolve, the conflict with Israel

The Palestini­an Authority has given no indic­a­tion that the putative State of Palestine would be a peace-loving State that respects the rule of law, democracy and human rights.  In fact the contrary is true.  Although much more could be written about this, the following will suffice to illus­trate the point.

• Both before and since the Oslo Accords were signed in the 1990s, Palestini­an leaders have made public state­ments con­firm­ing that Palestini­an statehood will not bring about the end of the conflict with Israel, or a com­mit­ment to resolve out­stand­ing claims by peaceful means, but will instead mark the opening of a new and more intense phase of the conflict, which will continue to be pro­sec­uted until Israel ceases to exist.[19]
• Claims that the Palestini­ans have the sole right to the land from the Jordan River to the Medi­ter­ranean Sea, and that there is no place for a Jewish State in any part of the land, are ration­al­ised by ahis­tor­ic­al and racist asser­tions that Jews have no history in the land. A notorious example was a speech by PA President Mahmoud Abbas to the Palestine National Council on 1 May 2018, which was so odious that even the main Palestini­an lobby group in Germany publicly condemned it as “antisemitic”, stating: “To suggest that Jews in some way share a respons­ib­il­ity for the Holocaust is a grotesque dis­tor­tion of his­tor­ic­al facts. The claim that the Jewish people have no roots in the Holy Land is equally erroneous.”[20]
• Abbas repeated these calumnies in a speech to the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inali­en­able Rights of the Palestini­an People on 15 May 2023.[21]

Recog­ni­tion of Palestini­an statehood in the present cir­cum­stances would effect­ively reward the Palestini­an Authority for this posture of hostility towards Israel and rejection of its legit­im­acy, the very opposite of what is needed to keep alive the prospects of achieving two States for two peoples.

4. Both the PA and Hamas lack legit­im­acy in the eyes of a majority of Palestini­ans

Mahmoud Abbas was elected President of the PA on 9 January 2005 for a four-year term that ended on 9 January 2009. He is now in the 19^th year of that four-year term. The last elections for the Palestini­an Legis­lat­ive Council (PLC) were held on 25 January 2006. There have not been any elections either for president or for the PLC since those two elections, with elections in the PA since those dates having only been for local offices.   Elections for President have been scheduled, most recently in 2021, only to be called off. Polling conducted by the Palestini­an Centre for Policy and Survey Research last December concluded:[22]

• 26% of Palestini­ans said Hamas is most deserving of rep­res­ent­ing and leading the Palestini­an people, while 24% said Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving; the largest group – 44% – think neither side deserves such a role;
• 52% supported dis­solv­ing the PA;
• 82% said there is cor­rup­tion in PA insti­tu­tions and 71% said there is cor­rup­tion in public insti­tu­tions con­trolled by Hamas in Gaza;
• a majority of Palestini­ans (63%) view the PA as a burden on the Palestini­an people while 33% view it as an asset; and
• 22% are optim­ist­ic and 75% are pess­im­ist­ic about recon­cili­ation between the PA and Hamas.

5. There is no currently-existing entity that is viable as a Palestini­an State

In addition to the fact that the PA does not exercise effective control of the West Bank and Gaza, many observers, including US officials have expressed concern that the PA is on the verge of collapse.[23]  It would be bizarre and embar­rass­ing for Australia if it were to extend recog­ni­tion to an entity that becomes a failed State from the outset.

The most recent reports of the World Bank[24] and the IMF[25] have also shown that a putative Palestini­an State is not eco­nom­ic­ally viable.    The World Bank concluded: “: “Fiscal sus­tain­ab­il­ity requires a strong mac­roe­co­nom­ic found­a­tion, and this cannot be achieved without actions by the PA and the GoI as well as support from donors”.

In short, the Palestini­an Authority is not eco­nom­ic­ally self-sus­tain­ing. Its public spending is in need of fun­da­ment­al reform and it will continue to need co-operation from Israel and financial support from donor States.   Both could be readily achieved in the context of a peace agreement with Israel, but not while the PA maintains its current posture of hostility towards it.

6. ‘Pay-for-slay’

A stark illus­tra­tion of the implac­able nature of the PA’s is hostility towards Israel, and the rela­tion­ship of this hostility to the dys­func­tion­al­ity of the PA’s public finances, is the fact that PA President Mahmoud Abbas is directly respons­ible for paying monthly cash stipends to the families of dead ter­ror­ists and to imprisoned ter­ror­ists. In 2010, he approved a salary hike for terrorist prisoners including a 300% rise – from NIS 4,000 per month to NIS 12,000 per month – for prisoners who serve more than 30 years in prison for murder. In 2007, 2009 and 2013, Abbas approved a hike in the monthly allow­ances paid to the families of dead ter­ror­ists, including suicide bombers.[26]

In practice, the ‘pay for slay’ policy results in money being paid to an arch-terrorist like Raed Al-Houtari.  In 2001, Al-Houtari des­patched a suicide bomber to blow up the Dol­phin­ari­um dis­cotheque on the beach­front in Tel Aviv, instantly killing 20 Israelis, 16 of whom were teenagers, most of them girls. More than 90 people were wounded.[27]  Al-Houtari was arrested in 2003, tried and sentenced to 22 con­sec­ut­ive life sentences. Al-Houtari has so far received well over $US 200,000 in payments from the PA and he will continue to receive a monthly salary from the PA for the rest of his life,[28] in effect as a reward for being a mass murderer of Israelis within the heartland of Israel.

7. The PA continues to educate Palestini­an children to hate Jews and never make peace with Israel

Another example of this hostility is the PA school cur­riculum which has con­sist­ently propag­ated overt antisemitic canards and con­spir­acies, rejection of peace­mak­ing, and the glor­i­fic­a­tion of violence and ter­ror­ists.  A 2021 study showed that PA textbooks and study cards include antisemitic descrip­tions of Jews as devious, treach­er­ous and hostile; myths about Jewish control of global events, encour­age­ment of students to engage in to violence and commit jihad against Israelis so as to die as martyrs, denial of Jewish people­hood and right of self-determ­in­a­tion, and the erasure of Israel from maps.[29]  The findings of this study were similar to those of a study conducted by the Georg Eckert Institute for Inter­na­tion­al Textbook Research on behalf of the European Com­mis­sion.[30]

In April 2018, the European par­lia­ment passed legis­la­tion seeking to prevent aid to the Palestini­an Authority from their main donors in the EU from being used to inculcate extremism, hatred and violence in Palestini­an school children.[31]  In May 2021, the European Par­lia­ment adopted a res­ol­u­tion insisting that “EU funding for salaries paid to teachers and public servants in the education sector must be made con­di­tion­al” on producing edu­ca­tion­al material promoting peace and tolerance.[32]  The European Par­lia­ment adopted a further res­ol­u­tion in September 2022 in which it deplored the fact that inap­pro­pri­ate and hateful material in Palestini­an school textbooks had not been removed for the third year in a row and expressed concern about the continued failure to act effect­ively against hate speech and violence.[33]  On 10 May 2023, for the fourth con­sec­ut­ive year, the European Par­lia­ment passed a res­ol­u­tion con­demning the PA over the “hateful” content of its textbooks, and con­di­tion­ing future funding for education on the removal of antisemitic material.[34] As recently as 12 July 2023, the European Union passed two res­ol­u­tions (A9-0226/48 and 51)[35] calling for a temporary sus­pen­sion of the $US 220 million of aid it awards the Palestini­an Authority, citing its continued inclusion of antisemitic and violent themes in school curricula.

Given this indoc­trin­a­tion from an early age, it is little wonder that a survey published by the Palestini­an Centre for Policy and Survey Research in March 2023 found that 68% of Palestini­ans (71% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank) said they are in favour of forming armed terrorist groups such as the “Lions’ Den,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services; only 25% were opposed.[36]

8. Palestini­an leaders cannot meet even the most basic pre­con­di­tions for recog­ni­tion of statehood

In the early 1990s new States were born out of the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. These new States were fre­quently in armed and political conflict with one other over his­tor­ic­al disputes con­cern­ing territory and national, ethnic and religious identity. Accord­ingly, on 16 December 1991, the European Council adopted a Declar­a­tion on the “Guidelines on the Recog­ni­tion of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,” which stip­u­lated the following addi­tion­al require­ments for recog­nising those new States:

• respect for the pro­vi­sions of the Charter of the United Nations and the com­mit­ments sub­scribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, espe­cially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights,
• guar­an­tees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minor­it­ies in accord­ance with the com­mit­ments sub­scribed to in the framework of the CSCE, [The Com­mis­sion on Security and Cooper­a­tion in Europe]
• respect for the invi­ol­ab­il­ity of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement,
• accept­ance of all relevant com­mit­ments with regard to dis­arm­a­ment and nuclear non-pro­lif­er­a­tion as well as to security and regional stability,
• com­mit­ment to settle by agreement, including where appro­pri­ate by recourse to arbit­ra­tion, all questions con­cern­ing State suc­ces­sion and regional disputes.[37] 

The European Council addi­tion­ally required each of the new Republics, “to commit itself, prior to recog­ni­tion, to adopt con­sti­tu­tion­al and political guar­an­tees ensuring that it has no ter­rit­ori­al claims towards a neigh­bor­ing… State and that it will conduct no hostile pro­pa­ganda activ­it­ies versus a neigh­bor­ing … State.”[38]

It is evident that a putative State of Palestine, as a pre­con­di­tion of recog­ni­tion, would not be able or willing to meet equi­val­ent oblig­a­tions with respect to its Jewish State neighbour.  In par­tic­u­lar, it would lack the capacity to honour any com­mit­ments to respect the invi­ol­ab­il­ity of even the pre-1967 ceasefire lines with Israel, to repudiate all further ter­rit­ori­al claims beyond those lines, to cease all incite­ment and hostile pro­pa­ganda against Israel and to settle all out­stand­ing ter­rit­ori­al and other disputes with Israel by peaceful means, assuming it was prepared to give such com­mit­ments. Thus, from the outset, it would not be a peace-loving State with regard to Israel, able and willing to meet the oblig­a­tions of a State under the UN Charter. In those cir­cum­stances, recog­ni­tion of a Palestini­an State could only serve as an encour­age­ment to further hos­til­it­ies and violence, thereby under­min­ing regional and inter­na­tion­al peace and security, and putting a nego­ti­ated peace set­tle­ment, and an actual Palestini­an state, even further out of reach. 

[1] James Massola, ‘Victorian Labor gives Albanese deadline to recognise Palestine’, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 2023.

[2] Ibid.

[3] This is the ‘declar­at­ory theory’ of State recog­ni­tion in inter­na­tion­al law. It maintains that recog­ni­tion is merely an acknow­ledg­ment by States of an already-existing situation. A new State acquires a legal per­son­al­ity and legal capacity only if and when it actually begins to operate as a State ‘on the ground’. The contrary view is the ‘con­stitutive theory’, which maintains that it is the act of recog­ni­tion by other States that creates a new State and endows it with legal per­son­al­ity.  States generally do not follow the con­stitutive theory.  “Practice over the last century or so is not unam­bigu­ous but does point to the declar­at­ory approach as the better of the two theories”: Malcolm N. Shaw, Inter­na­tion­al Law, (Seventh edition), (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­ver­sity Press, 2014), p. 323.  Article 3 of the Mon­tevid­eo Con­ven­tion on the Rights and Duties of States 1933 ((1934) 165 League of Nations Treaty Series 19: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp) expli­citly states that “The political existence of the state is inde­pend­ent of recog­ni­tion by the other states.”  See also Arbit­ra­tion Com­mis­sion, E.C. Con­fer­ence on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 1, 20 November 1991, paras 1(a) and (b), repro­duced at Vol 92 Inter­na­tion­al Law Reports (1993) p. 162 and 164 – 165.

[4] On 18 October 2022, Foreign Minister Penny Wong cri­ti­cised the former government’s decision in 2018 to recognise West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, con­tend­ing that the 2018 decision had been a break from “Australia’s previous and long­stand­ing position that Jerusalem is a final status issue that should be resolved as part of any peace nego­ti­ations between Israel and the Palestini­an people.” (Emphasis added). https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/reversal-recognition-west-jerusalem

[5] Statement by Foreign Minister Penny Wong in answer to a question from Senator David Fawcett, Foreign Affairs, Defence And Trade Legis­la­tion Committee, Senate Estimates Hearing, 16.2.2023, p.42

[6] For example, Professor Guy Goodwin-Gill, an eminent inter­na­tion­al lawyer who rep­res­en­ted the Palestini­ans before the Inter­na­tion­al Court of Justice in the 2004 “Wall” case, has concluded:

“Until such a time as a final set­tle­ment is agreed, the putative SFtate of Palestine will have no territory over which it exercises effective sov­er­eignty, its borders will be inde­term­in­ate or disputed, its pop­u­la­tion, actual and potential, undeter­mined and many of them con­tinu­ing to live under occu­pa­tion or in States of refuge. While it may be an observer State in the United Nations, it will fall short of meeting the inter­na­tion­ally agreed criteria of statehood, with serious implic­a­tions for Palestini­ans at large.…”: ‘The Palestine Lib­er­a­tion Organ­iz­a­tion, the future State of Palestine, and the question of popular rep­res­ent­a­tion’, Legal Opinion dated 10 August 2011, para. 9.

[7] (1934) 165 League of Nations Treaty Series 19: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp

[8] D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on Inter­na­tion­al Law (5^th ed), (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), p.102.

[9] See Opinion of Professor Goodwin-Gill, Note 6.

[10][10] See, for example, the statement of Hamas spokes­per­son Sami Abu Zuhri that “No one has author­ized [PLO Chair and PA President] Mahmoud Abbas to represent the Palestini­an people and no one is obligated to any position he’s issued”: Dov Lieber and Eric Cor­tellessa, ‘Hamas Rejects Abbas Peace Proposal Outline to Trump’, Times of Israel, 3 May 2017.

[11] Dr Shaul Bartal, ‘Are we wit­ness­ing the end of the Palestini­an Authority?’, BESA Centre, Per­spect­ives Paper No. 2,198, May 23, 2023

[12] Arbit­ra­tion Com­mis­sion, E.C. Con­fer­ence on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 10, 4 July 1992, para 4.

[13] General Assembly of res­ol­u­tion 67/19, 29 November 2012.

[14]   Article 10, UN Charter. See dis­cus­sion on UN website: https://www.un.org/en/model-united-nations/how-decisions-are-made-un#:~:text=The%20only%20resolutions%20that%20have,adopted%20by%20the%20Security%20Council.&text=This%20explains%20why%20Member%20States,widest%20possible%20agreement%20among%20them.

[15] Both of which, in their entirety, are listed as terrorist organ­isa­tions by Australia, among other countries.

[16] Access­ible via: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IL%20PS_950928_InterimAgreementWestBankGazaStrip%28OsloII%29.pdf

[17] ‘Opinion in the Matter of the Jur­is­dic­tion of the ICC with regard to the Declar­a­tion of the Palestini­an Authority’, by   Professor Malcolm Shaw QC, 9 September 2009, p.18, paras 41 – 42.

[18] Ibid, p.20, para 46. See also James Crawford, The Creation of States in Inter­na­tion­al Law, (Oxford: Oxford Uni­ver­sity Press, 2^nd edition, 2006), Chapter 3, ‘Inter­na­tion­al Law Con­di­tions for the Creation of States’.

[19] Some of the more notorious of these state­ments, including by PA President Mahmoud Abbas, are repro­duced in ‘PLO Tells Its People to Resist Until Israel Is Destroyed by ‘Return’’, Alge­mein­er, 4 May 2018.

[20] ‘German Palestini­an group slams Abbas Holocaust speech’, Times of Israel, 2 May 2018.

[21] Tovah Lazaroff, ‘Abbas disavows Jewish ties to Temple Mount, compares Israel to Nazis’, Jerusalem Post, 16 May 2023.

[22] Palestini­an Centre for Policy and Survey Research, ‘Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No. 87’, 23 March 2023.

[23] Jacob Magid, ‘Shin Bet chief in Wash­ing­ton for talks with US officials fearful of PA collapse’, Times of Israel, 2 June 2023

[24] ‘World Bank Mon­it­or­ing report to the Ad Hoc Committee’, April 2023, para 13, p.12.

[25] IMF, ‘West Bank and Gaza Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee’, 14 April 2023.

[26] Maurice Hirsch, ‘The Abyss that divides the Israeli lead­er­ship from the PA lead­er­ship’, Jerusalem Post, 1 June 2020.

[27] David Rudge, ‘Bomb horror hits Tel Aviv disco’, Jerusalem Post, 4 June 2001.

[28] Maurice Hirsch, ‘The Abyss that divides the Israeli lead­er­ship from the PA lead­er­ship’, Jerusalem Post, 1 June 2020.

[29] A summary of findings is set out in ‘Palestini­an Authority Ministry of Education Study Cards 2021 – 22, Grades 1 – 11’, Institute for Mon­it­or­ing Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education, January 2022, p.10.

[30] ‘EU study finds incite­ment in Palestini­an textbooks, kept from public’, Jerusalem Post, 9 June 2021.

[31] European Par­lia­ment, 2014 – 2019, Texts Adopted, P8_TA(2018)0121, paragraph 272, p.54.

[32] European Par­lia­ment, 2019 – 2024, Texts Adopted, P9_TA(2021)0164, paragraph 444, p.97.

[33] European Par­lia­ment, 2019 – 2024, Texts Adopted, P9_TA(2022)0144, paragraph 175, p.57.

[34] ‘EU Par­lia­ment slams ‘hateful’ Palestini­an textbooks, threatens funding freeze’, Times of Israel, 11 May 2023.

[35] ‘European Par­lia­ment Calls Again for Freezing Palestini­an Aid Over Antisemitic Content in Textbooks’,Alge­mein­er, 12 July 2023.

[36] Palestini­an Centre for Policy and Survey Research, ‘Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No. 87’, 23 March 2023.

[37] Repro­duced in (1991) 62 British Yearbook of Inter­na­tion­al Law 559 et seq.

[38] Repro­duced in (1991) 62 British Yearbook of Inter­na­tion­al Law 559 et seq.