The following article has been published in the Aus­trali­an Institute of Inter­na­tion­al Affairs by Alex Ryvchin.

While states such as Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have issued tepid state­ments of support for the US “peace plan,” other states are not so convinced. What will this mean for stability in the region?

The Arab League has joined the Organ­isa­tion of Islamic Countries (OIC) in formally rejecting the Trump plan to end the Israeli-Palestini­an conflict. The OIC had earlier called on its 57 member-states “not to engage with this plan or to cooperate with the US admin­is­tra­tion in imple­ment­ing it in any form.”  Despite the appear­ance of Arab and Islamic solid­ar­ity, the response of indi­vidu­al gov­ern­ments has been far more nuanced, revealing an increas­ing frus­tra­tion with the Palestini­an issue and a desire to break the long­stand­ing Arab League position of rejecting nor­m­al­isa­tion of relations with Israel or even recog­nising the existence of the Jewish State. Egypt, with whom Israel has enjoyed a state of peace since 1979, and Saudi Arabia issued tepid state­ments of support for US attempts to broker an end to the conflict. Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates all sent their ambas­sad­ors to attend the unveiling of the Trump plan.

After Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held talks with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of Sudan’s sovereign council on 3 February, the Israeli leader announced that the two countries have agreed to begin nor­m­al­ising relations, a move the Palestini­ans quickly condemned as a “stab in the back.” The announce­ment con­sti­tutes a landmark dip­lo­mat­ic achieve­ment for Israel and one replete with symbolism. It was in Sudan that the Arab League adopted the famous “Three No’s of Khartoum” position, whereby the Arab world resolved that there was to be no peace with Israel, no recog­ni­tion of Israel, and no nego­ti­ations with it. The meeting between the Israeli Prime Minister and the trans­ition­al gov­ern­ment of Sudan took place in Entebbe, Uganda, the city where in 1976 Israeli commandos launched a spec­tac­u­lar raid to liberate hostages after an Air France flight had been hijacked by Palestini­an militants and given shelter in Uganda by Idi Amin. The raid was led by Yonatan Netanyahu, the elder brother of the Israeli premier, who was killed during the operation.

The reaction of the Arab world reflects a marked thaw in attitudes towards Israel, brought about by an increas­ing real­isa­tion that Israel poses no threat to those who do not threaten it, a mutual interest in con­front­ing Iran, and a desire to achieve economic cooper­a­tion with a country that has shown itself uniquely adept at building prosper­ity despite a lack of natural resources. Equally, it reflects a will­ing­ness to view Israel as more than merely a party to an enduring and possibly irre­con­cil­able conflict. This is a major blow to the Palestini­an strategy of max­im­ising its bar­gain­ing position by making Israel’s engage­ment with the Arab world con­di­tion­al on it first meeting Palestini­an demands.

However, the gradual erosion of uniform hostility to Israel in the Arab world may create the con­di­tions necessary for eventual peace, or at least lead to the resump­tion of bilateral nego­ti­ations. Despite reflex­ively calling the proposal a “hoax” and a “fraud” and suc­ceed­ing in obtaining official Arab League support for its position, the Palestini­an lead­er­ship will be concerned by the growing number of Arab League member-states who no longer see Israel as an enemy to be relent­lessly fought. This may in turn lead the Palestini­an lead­er­ship to make some con­struct­ive gesture towards peace to shake of the accus­a­tion of intransigence.

Ulti­mately, peace can only be achieved through com­prom­ise. Com­prom­ise requires accepting less than one’s optimum outcome. The Palestini­ans may feel that having to negotiate over the terms of their statehood, a right they hold to be self-evident, is com­prom­ise enough. Indeed, at the Arab League meeting in Cairo, Palestini­an leader Mahmoud Abbas held aloft a series of maps titled “The Palestini­ans Historic Com­prom­ise” pur­portedly showing a pro­gres­sion from a wholly Arab Palestine in 1947 to the far smaller lands offered to them in the Trump plan. The maps, highly mis­lead­ing given that an Arab State of Palestine has never existed and that Palestini­an autonomy has increased over time in spite of suc­cess­ive rejec­tions of inter­na­tion­ally-brokered two state solutions, do reveal a key reality of Middle-East peace­mak­ing. Time is not on the side of the Palestini­ans, and each missed oppor­tun­ity has left their national movement in a weaker position, while Israel, now in its 72^nd year of statehood has benefited from the decisions of its early leaders to com­prom­ise, accept less, in pursuit of the ultimate goal of statehood and the upbuild­ing of a national home.

In 1937, a British Royal Com­mis­sion, which for the first time offered partition of the land and a two-state solution, concluded that “half a loaf is better than no bread”, and while “partition means that neither will get what it wants … both parties will come to realise that the drawbacks of partition are out­weighed by its advant­ages.”  The “advantage” offered to the Jews at that time, was a miniscule Jewish State, a society which they could organise according to their own ideals, a place to grant refuge to those needing it, and enlarge Jewish cultural and sci­entif­ic achieve­ments. This oppor­tun­ity was too mean­ing­ful to reject, even if at that time the Jewish State offered was on a mere 4 percent of the ori­gin­ally mandated territory.

The question of partition was rejected out of hand by the Arab side, which instead pledged the “lib­er­a­tion of the country and estab­lish­ment of an Arab gov­ern­ment.” The ensuing wars in pursuit of “lib­er­a­tion” have resulted in dis­place­ment, loss of life, and a cor­res­pond­ing loss of political leverage on the Palestini­an side. The Palestini­ans, in rejecting this later proposal without so much as comment or counter-offer, are now finding that it is they that are becoming increas­ingly isolated, and are losing the sym­path­ies and attention of even their most depend­able sup­port­ers.

Alex Ryvchin is the co-Chief Executive Officer of the Executive Council of Aus­trali­an Jewry. His new book is “Zionism – The Concise History”.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be repub­lished with attri­bu­tion.