ECAJ EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN JEWRY

הועד הפועל של יהודי אוסטרליה

The Elected Peak Representative Body of the Australian Jewish Community

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Committee Secretary
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee
Department of the Senate
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600

23 October 2026

Dear Committee Secretary,

The Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the Inquiry into transnational repression and foreign interference.

Introduction

The Executive Council of Australian Jewry (the **ECAJ**) is the peak, elected, representative body of the Australian Jewish community. It was established for that purpose in 1944 by Australian Jewish organisations and their elected leaders. The ECAJ's constituent organisations are the roof bodies of the Jewish community in each State and Territory.[1] Other major national Jewish organisations are affiliated to the ECAJ. Directly or indirectly some 200 Jewish organisations come under the umbrella of the ECAJ[2] and have a range of security needs and other concerns that relate to risks and threats posed by transnational repression and foreign interference in Australia.

In recent times, Jewish communal leaders and our community at large have faced increasing constraints on the ability to participate freely and equally in public life due to heightened security risks and an increased threat level. Transnational repression and foreign interference have contributed to this evolving environment. ASIO Director-General, Mike Burgess, explicitly recognised the specific danger these developments pose to the Australian Jewish community in the 2025 annual threat assessment, and again during a Senate Estimates hearing on 25 February 2025, when he stated:

> "*In terms of threats to life,* [antisemitism is] *my agency's number one priority because of the weight of incidents we're seeing play out in this country.*

[1] Namely, the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies, the Jewish Community Council of Victoria Inc, the Jewish Community Council of Western Australia Inc, the Queensland Jewish Board of Deputies, the Jewish Community Council of South Australia, the Hobart Hebrew Congregation, the ACT Jewish Community Inc and the NT Jewish Community Association.
[2] https://www.ecaj.org.au/about/

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Council of Progressive Rabbis
Federation of Australian Jewish Ex-Service Associations
New Zealand Jewish Council
Zionist Federation of Australia
Council of Orthodox Synagogues of Australia

> *I don't believe we've done that in our history, certainly not in my six years as director general… It's the volume of incidents that we are dealing with."*[3]

Director-General Burgess then elaborated on the changes to the security environment in the 2026 annual threat assessment, stating that:

> *"…we face multifaceted instability where state sponsored aggression and domestic volatility intersect.*
>
> *At the centre of this convergence are the acute and persistent pressures of espionage, foreign interference, and politically motivated violence. However, the perimeter is expanding.*
>
> *We are already seeing surges of communal violence and preparation for sabotage. This diversity represents a systematic challenge to national security.*
>
> *Antisemitism is a case in point."*[4]

Foreign-state intimidation can take the form of violence against communal institutions and gatherings, surveillance of individuals, threats to family members abroad, covert recruitment of intermediaries, online harassment and manipulation of public discourse. The effects extend beyond those experienced by individual victims: fear can suppress lawful advocacy, erode confidence in public institutions and fracture our cohesiveness. Australia should judge its response both by disruption and prosecutions and by whether affected people and groups can participate safely in public life.

The ECAJ urges a whole-of-government response integrating security, regulatory transparency, community protection, digital resilience and international cooperation. It is our hope that the findings and recommendations in these areas of the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion (**Royal Commission**), whose final report is scheduled to be released on 18 December 2026, will help address the problem of transnational repression and foreign interference. As some of the evidence before the Royal Commission has demonstrated, transnational repression and foreign interference have impacts well beyond the Australian Jewish community. The failure properly to address the root causes and drivers will not only impact individuals and communities which are targeted but will also have broader societal consequences,

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[3] Moore, Hannah, 'ASIO boss Mike Burgess declares antisemitism agency's top priority in terms of threats to life', *News.com.au*, 26 February 2025, available at: https://www.news.com.au/national/politics/asio-boss-mike-burgess-declares-antisemitism-agencys-top-priority-in-terms-of-threats-to-life/news-story/f3587554ecbeb9f36e4759976fa0b997.

[4] Director-General's Annual Threat Assessment 2026, 24 June 2026, available at: Director-General's Annual Threat Assessment 2026 | ASIO

creating a "chilling effect" on freedom of speech and on political freedoms more generally, thereby destabilizing and undermining our democracy.

1. State-directed violence against Jewish institutions (terms a, b and h)

The clearest Australian illustration of the danger of transnational repression and foreign interference is the Australian Government's attribution in August 2025 of the December 2024 arson attack on the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne and the October 2024 arson attack on Lewis' Continental Kitchen in Sydney to operations directed by Iran through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)[5]. The ECAJ's 2025 antisemitic incidents report records that official confirmation that both targets were selected specifically because they were identified as *Jewish* targets. [6]

The attacks show how an overseas principal may exploit locally recruited actors, in an attempt to insulate those directing the operation from immediate detection. A policy response restricted to identifying the immediate offender will not adequately address financing, direction, facilitation or the intimidation objective. The ECAJ strongly supported and advocated in favour of the listing of the IRGC as a state terrorist organisation and urged rigorous scrutiny of its international networks.[7] The Committee should review any findings of the Royal Commission that are relevant to the issue of transnational repression and foreign interference, and may wish to supplement any examination as to whether intelligence-sharing, financial investigation, sanctions and criminal law adequately identify and disrupt those who commission or facilitate attacks.

Case study: State of New South Wales v Farhat (final) [2026] NSWSC 985

A recent decision in *State of New South Wales v Farhat (final)* [2026] NSWSC 985 is particularly problematic for several reasons. The judgment demonstrates a lacuna in the law's ability to respond to foreign-directed attacks perpetrated by individuals who have been recruited primarily for financial reward rather than ideological, religious or political motivation. In that case, Fagan J dismissed the State's application for an extended supervision order against Farhat under the *Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017* (NSW)after Farhat had been convicted of offences arising from his spray-painting of slogans including "Fuk Israel" on cars and buildings in Woollahra, and

[5] Tingle, Laura, 'Revelations Iran was behind antisemitic attacks show IRGC tentacles have reached Australia', ABC News, 26 August 2025, available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-08-26/iran-antisemitic-attacks-asio-intelligence-anthony-albanese/105698844

[6] Executive Council of Australian Jewry, Report on Anti-Jewish Incidents in Australia 2025, https://www.ecaj.org.au/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ECAJ-Report-Anti-Jewish-Incidents-Australia-2025.pdf

[7] ECAJ submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security review of the listing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a state sponsor of terrorism under the Criminal Code, 30 January 2026, available at: https://www.ecaj.org.au/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/20260130-ECAJ-submission-on-IRGC-listing-as-state-sponsor-of-terrorism.pdf

setting a vehicle alight. His Honour found that Farhat was "a vandal for hire", recruited and paid to commit the offences, and that the State had not established that he had adopted any aspect of Hezbollah's belief system, despite the fact that Farhat had a Hezbollah symbol tattooed on his neck.[8] He then went further, concluding that nothing in the evidence before the court or from open sources, demonstrates that Hezbollah is inherently antisemitic[9]. This finding was unsupported by evidence and was not only factually incorrect but perverse. There is strong evidence linking Hezbollah to transnational terrorist attacks against Jews and Jewish community targets outside the Middle East, including the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Community Centre in Buenos Aires.[10]

Although there was no judicial finding that the offending was directed by a foreign regime, the case illustrates the difficulties that may arise where criminal intermediaries are used to perpetrate attacks designed to intimidate particular communities. In this case the slogan "PKK is coming" also appeared in graffiti at the crime scene, which was nearby to the Turkish Consulate.[11] This was a 'false flag' which risked stoking animus towards the Australian Kurdish community – a community that has demonstrated its empathy towards the Australian Jewish community in the face of rising antisemitism.

Case study: Dural caravan incident

A caravan containing explosives said to be capable of causing a "mass casualty event" with a 40-metre diameter blast and documents suggesting they may have been intended for use in an antisemitic attack on a synagogue were found in January 2025 in Dural in north-west Sydney. The incident was subsequently revealed to be a fabrication. Although it was only made to appear like a terrorism plot, the intention to create fear in the Jewish community was an essential part of that plot. The plot was carried out by criminals located both in Australia and overseas, who purchased the caravan, filled it with explosives and antisemitic material, and then engineered tip-offs to police.[12] The incident had an intimidatory effect on the Australian Jewish community and resulted in the publication of substantial antisemitic conspiracy theory-related posts.[13]

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[8] *Farhat*, [19](1), (4), [80].
[9] *Farhat*, [149]-[150]
[10] Giambertoni, Marzia, 'Hezbollah's networks in Latin America', *Rand Corporation*, March 2025: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA3500/PEA3585-1/RAND_PEA3585-1.pdf
[11] McSweeney, Jessica; Buckley, Penry; and Walter, Riley, 'Masked men flee scene of 'political' vandalism on cars, eastern suburbs restaurant, *SMH*, 21 November 2024, available at: Woollahra vandalism: Matt Moran's Chiswick graffitied, car set on fire in Sydney's eastern suburbs
[12] 10 March 2025, AFP Deputy Commissioner National Security Krissy Barrett: statement on Operation Kissinger | Australian Federal Police
[13] For example, Palestine Action Group published such posts: https://www.facebook.com/syd.bmbc/posts/pfbid0vPdegccQbj5tXxkwuyJHFV6yAiB532aeGBCoZFA3fG9gMSVoo8DTMGAa9HvYkjrPl, as did many other users.

ASIO has separately confirmed that the Iranian regime directed attacks against Jewish targets in Australia through complex networks of proxies.[14] The ECAJ submits that Australia's legislative and investigative frameworks should be reviewed for any gaps open to exploitation by malign regimes or individuals located abroad, and that the Committee should continue to consult closely with ASIO and the AFP regarding the threats posed by foreign interference, including to the Jewish community, and to consider implementing any recommendations they may have regarding the need to strengthen Australia's capabilities to respond to this. Foreign-directed intimidation and violence must be effectively identified, prosecuted and prevented, including in instances where the immediate perpetrator may lack ideological motivation or knowledge of the ultimate foreign sponsor, or where it cannot be proved to the criminal standard that such motivation or knowledge existed.

2. Diaspora intimidation and the chilling of democratic participation (terms 1, 2, 4 and 5)

The ECAJ receives notifications from time to time of foreign interference. Such reports are challenging to address because the reporting party often wishes to remain anonymous and is not willing to make a formal complaint or notify the relevant authorities. It is evident that the lack of suitable protections and interventions undermines the security of individuals in such scenarios, as well as weakening the resilience of our democracy and harming the exercise of human rights.

The Australian-Iranian Community Organisation (AICO) emphasises that the measure of success should be timely safety assistance, including when attribution cannot be proved to a criminal standard. It identifies threats to relatives overseas, exposure of personal information, surveillance and repeated lower-level incidents as cumulative risks. ECAJ supports that victim-centred approach and AICO's careful distinction between the Islamic Republic theocratic system of government and Iranian Australians, many of whom oppose its policies.[15]

A Kurdish community representative has separately conveyed reports of Kurdish Australians being questioned, arrested or charged when travelling to Turkey following cultural or community participation in Australia; of surveillance, photographs and online targeting allegedly linked to Turkish authorities; and of threats or pressure against relatives in Iran following Australian demonstrations. These are community-reported allegations, not independently verified findings by

[14] 'Australian government announcement on the involvement of Iranian regime in antisemitic firebombing incidents', 26 August 2025: https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-parliament-house-canberra-38

[15] Australian-Iranian Community Organisation, Transnational repression and foreign interference: Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, 17 October 2026 (user-supplied submission); see also its references to AFP reporting of German proceedings, https://www.timesofisrael.com/germany-jails-two-men-for-iran-backed-plots-against-pro-israel-figures-spying-on-jews/

ECAJ. They nonetheless illustrate why the Committee should receive protected evidence and examine cross-border family coercion, travel risk and retaliation by foreign regimes.

Confidential reporting channels should allow people to obtain a risk assessment, legal referrals, cyber assistance and trauma-informed support without first establishing a foreign-state nexus. Agencies should communicate clearly about information sharing and confidentiality limits, offer qualified interpreters with conflict-of-interest safeguards and provide continuity through a designated contact in serious cases. Community organisations should be funded for independent education and referral.

Case study: prevalence of extremist and terrorist symbols at protests and links to foreign regimes and proscribed organisations

Since the 7 October 2023 massacre by terrorist organization Hamas of 1200 people in southern Israel, there has been a sharp rise in protest-related activity with an Israel/Palestine focus in Australia.[16] This has been accompanied by the proliferation of terrorist symbols and symbols of repressive foreign states that have an intimidatory and threatening effect on some communities, including the Australian Jewish community. The ECAJ annual antisemitism reports since 7 October 2023 record a substantial increase in antisemitic incidents, a significant proportion of which occur in the context of protests, including the display of Hamas and Hezbollah flags.

As confirmed by public testimony before the Roysl Commission, many Jewish Australians experience this as their shutting out of civil society, and they do not feel safe participating in protests of any kind. This is because of the anti-Israel and, in some instances, overtly anti-Jewish symbology, iconography and phraseology that has been appropriated in a range of areas. It is frequently reported that anti-Israel and/or anti-Jewish symbols and phrases are prevalent at all kinds of protests, as is pro-Palestine iconography.[17] This is not a phenomenon limited to Australia. For example, Pro-Palestinian and anti-ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) movements have increasingly merged in the U.S.

There are also reported links between the protests, antisemitic and pro-terrorist materials on display, and malign actors overseas. For example, the Russian regime has been implicated in the running of AI-driven 'bot farms', which promote disinformation aimed at sowing division in

[16] See affidavit of Assistant Commissioner Peter McKenna APM, in Commissioner of Police v Amal Naser, 5 October 2025, Case number 2025/00380924

[17] For example, see media coverage of the recent Pine Gap protest: Hundreds march on secretive military base Pine Gap in Alice Springs, in biggest protest at site in decades - ABC News

democratic societies. For such regimes, the protests are a tool to further diminish social cohesion.[18]

As AICO explains in its submission to the Royal Commission: "*Of particular concern was the public display of the image of the then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in August 2025 on Harbour Bridge. For many Iranian-Australians, such imagery is not comparable to the display of an ordinary political figure. Rather, it represents the head of a regime associated with widespread human rights abuses, systematic repression, and, as recognised by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, an organisation that has been linked to activities targeting Australian communities and undermining Australia's social cohesion*."[19]

Even in the context of an authorised public assembly, participants may be criminally liable if they damage property, engage in violence and/or serious public disorder offences.[20] There are several offences available at the state and commonwealth level with which to charge people who engage in such conduct. However, it has been the experience of the Australian Jewish community that all too often such acts go unprosecuted and unpunished, which may incentivize them further.

3. Digital repression and disinformation (terms 1, 2, 4 and 7)

Online methods can include impersonation, phishing, exposure of private information, fabricated news sites, coordinated harassment and AI-assisted content. Microsoft has reported an IRGC-linked subgroup impersonating journalists, while OpenAI described an Iranian covert influence operation using fabricated media identities.[21] [22]

Social media's prevalence has resulted in it being 'increasingly used as a vector for foreign interference'[23]. Social media is harnessed as a tool of transnational repression and foreign interference in various ways[24], including:

[18] Scwartzman, Eric, 'Bot farms invade social media to hijack popular sentiment', Fast Company, 24 April 2025, available at: Bot farms invade social media to hijack popular sentiment - Fast Company
[19] AICO submission to the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, 14 June 2026, available at: https://asc.royalcommission.gov.au/system/files/published_submissions/SUB.0001.0003.5730.pdf
[20] Commissioner of Police v Rintoul [2003] NSWSC 662, [24] (Simpson J).
[21] Microsoft Threat Intelligence, New TTPs observed in Mint Sandstorm campaign targeting high-profile individuals at universities and research orgs, 17 January 2024, available at: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
[22] OpenAI, Disrupting a covert Iranian influence operation, 16 August 2024, available at: https://openai.com/index/disrupting-a-covert-iranian-influence-operation/
[23] Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media, *Report*, August 2023, Chapter 1, [1.31].
[24] Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media, *Report*, August 2023, Chapter 2, [2.2].

1. gathering intelligence on individuals to target them;
2. gathering population level behavioural data to improve the effectiveness of interference campaigns;
3. harassing diaspora communities (particularly, Iranian, Chinese, and Russian communities); and
4. spreading misinformation or disinformation to achieve specified outcomes or manipulate community discourse and understanding about an issue to erode trust in democratic systems.

Disinformation thrived in the aftermath of the antisemitic terrorist attack against the Jewish community at Bondi Beach on 14 December 2025. This included AI images which suggested that the attacks were fabricated or planned by members of the Jewish community. These images received millions of views and initially appeared on the Russian 'news website' Pravda[25] (the Pravda network, launched by the Russian government in 2014, is a collection of fraudulent news portals promoting disinformation worldwide)[26]. False narratives were also spread in relation to the alleged gunman, with fabricated photos depicting him wearing a yarmulke and attending a bar mitzvah[27].

Foreign states, including Russia and Iran, have utilised disinformation of this nature in order to promote and incite antisemitic behaviour and rhetoric.

The ECAJ believes that there is a pressing need for steps to be taken to address the ability of foreign regimes to use social media to spread disinformation and misinformation, not only to limit its impact as a tool for the promotion of antisemitism, but also to mitigate the risks of disinformation and misinformation undermining social cohesion more broadly.

We note that evidence relating to this issue has been presented to the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, and we await the Commissioner's findings and recommendations when the report is issued on 18 December 2026.

Among the reforms that ECAJ seeks is a statutory digital duty of care, accompanied by substantial penalties. This is necessary to address online hate, including that which has confronted the Australian Jewish community. The proposed digital duty of care as currently drafted is insufficient because it does not protect against serious harm that has been done to vulnerable groups such as

[25] ABC News, *Racist and Antisemitic False Information Spreads Online Following Bondi Beach Terrorism Attack*, 16 December 2025).
[26] Atlantic Council – New Atlanticist, *Exposing Pravda: How Pro-Kremlin Forces Are Poisoning AI Models and Rewriting Wikipedia*, 18 April 2025
[27] ABC News, *AI-Generated Images of Bondi Gunman Used to Spread False Information*, 17 December 2025

our community. We have recently heard expert evidence from the Royal Commission that recommended that the duty should require platforms to take reasonable steps to minimise the risk of exposure to content that promotes discrimination, violence or serious harm on the basis of a protected attribute. We also believe it is necessary to legislate for a private right of legal action by those who have been harmed, to require prompt removal of unlawful or otherwise harmful online content impacting upon a protected group, with a reverse onus of proof on the provider, and the complainant's costs borne by the provider, once a prima face case is established. This will better achieve accountability for social media companies that do not engage in adequate preventative and disruptive work to avoid their platforms being used for harmful purposes, including by foreign regimes.

4. Universities, research and foreign financial influence (terms 1, 3, 7 and 8)

Universities are vital centres of free inquiry and legitimate international collaboration. Their openness also creates vulnerabilities where foreign-state funds, intermediaries or concealed contractual conditions are used to influence appointments, research agendas, teaching or advocacy.

There are at least three ways in which foreign funding of universities in Australia can be misused as a means of asserting foreign political influence:

1. Foreign government grants which are ostensibly for research and development, may be used to fund political advocacy in academic guise;
2. Foreign endowments and gifts to establish Centres, Chairs or Units of Study may become focal points for political, ideological or religious advocacy; and
3. Foreign government funding of fees may be sent with a dual purpose of assisting some foreign fee paying students to gain qualifications, while also agitating/organising, or potentially, money laundering.

The ECAJ considers that it would be worthwhile for the Committee to undertake extensive investigation of these concerns in assessing the scale and impact of transnational repression and foreign interference in Australia. Significant funding is evidently coming to Australian university departments and some of it may be intended to spread radical antisemitism or other types of extremist views.

The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (**ISGAP**) has uncovered and established that the foreign donations from Qatar, especially, have had a substantial impact on

fomenting growing levels of antisemitic discourse and campus politics at US universities, as well as growing support for anti-democratic values within these institutions of higher education.[28] We recommend that Australia's intelligence and law enforcement agencies should be empowered to access all universities' records of funding from foreign governments or any entity that is owned or substantially controlled by a foreign government, or any person acting under the authority of any such government or entity. We have also previously recommended that the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) should be vested with the power to require a university to conduct an audit and seek disclosure from specific staff as to any funding from any foreign government or government agency, or any entity that is owned or substantially controlled by a foreign government or government agency or any person acting under the authority of any such government or government agency or entity.

Finally, the ECAJ supports the Committee assessing the adequacy of the 2021 Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the Australian University Sector and identifying consistent national reporting standards.[29]

We also urge the Government to implement any other relevant recommendations emerging from the Royal Commission.

5. Legislative, financial and institutional gaps (terms 3 and 7)

The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor's July 2026 review proposed strengthened responses to transnational repression, including a coerced-repatriation offence and enhanced treatment of serious Commonwealth offences committed on behalf of a foreign principal, alongside safeguards for journalism and academic publication. ECAJ supports a timely, published government response, with careful consideration of elements, fault requirements, jurisdiction, enforcement feasibility and other matters.[30]

We note that on 27 June 2024, the Australian Government tabled its response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security's (**Joint Committee**) statutory review of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (**FITS Act**). The Government response states that it agrees in whole, in principle or in part to 12 of the Joint Committee's 14 recommendations and has

[28] ISGAP Director, Dr Charles Asher Small, presented the findings of an ISGA research project entitled "Follow the Money" in July 2019: Follow the Money: Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood Funding of Higher Education in the United States » ISGAP

[29] Australian Government, Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the Australian University Sector (2021)

[30] Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Review of Australia's espionage, foreign interference, sabotage and theft of trade secrets offences, July 2026, https://www.inslm.gov.au/reviews/review-australias-espionage-foreign-interference-sabotage-and-theft-trade-secrets-offences-division-82-and-part-52-criminal-code-act-1995

committed to substantial reform of the FITS Act. However, it does not appear that any amendments to the FITS Act have actually been implemented.

Having regard to the significant risks associated with transnational repression and foreign interference that we have highlighted in this submission, it is unclear why there has been no further action to bolster the FITS Act and improve enforcement outcomes. We respectfully submit that the Government revisit the Joint Committee's recommendations in order to ensure that Australia's legislative framework is adequate and fit for purpose.

In addition, financial tracing is critical where intermediaries receive direction, remuneration or logistical support from foreign principals. The Committee should assess the practical coordination of AFP, AUSTRAC, ASIO and sanctions authorities; beneficial-ownership visibility; cross-border evidence requests; and proportionate asset-freezing or targeted sanctions where the statutory thresholds are satisfied. Measures should avoid indiscriminate restrictions on diaspora remittances or charitable activity.

6. International cooperation and accountability (terms 5, 6 and 7)

International cooperation should include timely exchange of threat indicators, investigative assistance, financial intelligence, platform evidence and protection advice, while ensuring overseas disclosures do not expose complainants or relatives to reprisals. AICO cites October 2026 German proceedings concerning alleged Iranian-directed surveillance and plots targeting Jewish and pro-Israel figures as a reason to deepen cooperation.

An annual de-identified public report should distinguish reports received, referrals, credible threats assessed, assistance delivered, disruptions, charges and convictions, with appropriate protection for sources and operational details. Consultation with affected communities should test whether people feel safer and more willing to participate in civic life, including where no prosecution follows.

Conclusion

A foreign government should not be able to silence Australians, intimidate their relatives, distort democratic institutions or direct violence against communities through proxies. The ECAJ calls for targeted, evidence-based reforms that take into account any findings and recommendations of the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, and build upon those. Such reforms should protect both national security and the democratic freedoms that foreign interference seeks

to undermine. The safety of Jewish Australians and of other communities facing transnational repression is a shared national interest.

Yours sincerely

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