IS ZIONISM A “POLITICAL IDEOLOGY”?

1. The char­ac­ter­isa­tion of Zionism as a “political ideology” has long been a staple of the anti-Israel movement. The reason is not difficult to fathom. If Zionism is a political ideology, then criticism of Zionism is of the same character as criticism of any other political beliefs, and does not of itself entail hostility towards the Jewish people as a group. On this view anti-Zionism cannot con­sti­tute antisemitism unless it is couched in language that conveys such hostility.
   
   
2. Lately, this view has even found its way into judgments delivered in two Aus­trali­an cases, although it has been qualified in a third case and emphat­ic­ally rejected in a fourth.
   
   

The uncertain state of Aus­trali­an jur­is­pru­dence

3. In Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720 (1 July 2025), Justice Angus Stewart con­sidered whether a call made by a Muslim preacher for “Palestine” to be “cleansed from the filth of the Zionists” con­tra­vened the pro­vi­sions of Part IIA of the Racial Dis­crim­in­a­tion Act 1975, which prohibit Offensive Behaviour Based On Racial Hatred. Justice Stewart concluded [at 107]:
   
   

“The ordinary, reas­on­able listener would under­stand that not all Jews are Zionists or support the actions of Israel in Gaza and that dis­par­age­ment of Zionism con­sti­tutes dis­par­age­ment of a philo­sophy or ideology and not a race or ethnic group. Needless to say, political criticism of Israel, however inflam­mat­ory or adversari­al, is not by its nature criticism of Jews in general or based on Jewish racial or ethnic identity.

4. For the moment it is suf­fi­cient to draw attention to the shift in His Honour’s language from “dis­par­age­ment of Zionism” to “political criticism of Israel”. The two are not the same thing. Treating them as the same is, with respect, the error at the core of judicial confusion about the inter-rela­tion­ship between anti-Zionism and antisemitism. The sig­ni­fic­ance of the dif­fer­ence between “dis­par­age­ment of Zionism” and “political criticism of Israel” is addressed below.
   
   
5. In State of New South Wales v Farhat (final) [2026] NSWSC 985 (17 August 2026) the sole issue was whether the defendant, who had a Hezbollah tattoo on his neck and had been convicted of multiple serious offences in a neigh­bour­hood known to have a high con­cen­tra­tion of Jewish residents and a Jewish hospital, posed an unac­cept­able risk of com­mit­ting a serious terrorism offence upon his release from prison. Australia has listed Hezbollah as a terrorist organ­isa­tion. The defendant had been convicted of setting fire to a car and defacing buildings and cars in the neigh­bour­hood by spray-painting slogans on them including ‘F‑k Israel’. In the course of finding that the defendant does not pose such a risk, Justice Desmond Fagan went off on a tangent to express his political opinions on a range of other matters, including his own under­stand­ing of antisemitism and its rela­tion­ship to anti-Zionism [at 119]:
   
   

“As an ideology of Jewish nation­al­ism, Zionism is open to political dis­cus­sion and criticism, notably on grounds con­cern­ing the rights of the Palestini­ans. It may well be correct that “most, but not all Jewish Aus­trali­ans” regard Zionism as “a core part of their Jewish identity”. That does not mean that anti-Zionists are hostile to that majority of Jews on account of their Jew­ish­ness; only that they hold a negative view of a political ideology with which the majority of Jews have chosen to identify. Further, the words “most, but not all” are important. How can dis­par­age­ment of Zionism be hostile or pre­ju­diced towards Jews as Jews when it is only “most, but not all” Jews who support the ideology, with whatever degree of fervour?” (Emphases added)

6. Whether or not Zionism is an “ideology” of Jewish nation­al­ism that is divorced from any con­sid­er­a­tion of “Jews as Jews” is addressed below.
   
   
7. A more nuanced view of the rela­tion­ship between anti-Zionism and antisemitism was expressed by Justice Stephen McDonald in Cassuto v Kos­takid­is [2025] FCA 1226. Mr Cassuto alleged that Ms Kos­takid­is had used her page on the social media platform, X, to re-post certain posts of Hassan Nasrallah, the then leader of Hezbollah, calling for the destruc­tion of Israel and for Jews to leave Israel for other countries. The issue was whether these posts con­tra­vened the pro­vi­sions of Part IIA of the Racial Dis­crim­in­a­tion Act 1975. Ms Kos­takid­is made an inter­locutory applic­a­tion to the court for an order that the case to be struck out. She cited Stewart J’s analysis in Wertheim v Haddad (as quoted in 3 above) to support her sub­mis­sion that criticism of Israel is not capable of con­sti­tut­ing a con­tra­ven­tion of Part IIA of the Act. Justice McDonald rejected that sub­mis­sion. In con­sid­er­ing the above-quoted passage in Stewart J’s judgment, Justice McDonald stated [at 39]:
   
   

“Justice Stewart was not, in this passage, stating that a reference to Palestine being “cleansed from the filth of the Zionists” could not be offensive or insulting to Jewish people or to people of Israeli national origin in the sense relevant to s 18C of the RD Act. Nor did his Honour say that such a statement could never con­sti­tute a con­tra­ven­tion of s 18C because it was about Zionists and not Jews. He did not address that question. Rather, Stewart J was explain­ing why the statement did not establish the pleaded imputa­tion that “the Jewish people are filthy”. (emphasis added)

Justice McDonald concluded [at 47]:

“I do not accept Ms Kostakidis’s sub­mis­sion that it is not reas­on­ably arguable that speech which is directed to cri­ti­cising the actions of Israel can never con­tra­vene s 18C(1) of the RD Act. On the face of the provision, such speech may be unlawful if it is done because of the Jewish racial or ethnic origin or Israeli nation­al­ity of the iden­ti­fied group. That is what I under­stand Mr Cassuto to allege in the present case. Whether he can make good that alleg­a­tion is appro­pri­ately a matter for trial.” (emphasis added)

8. It follows that there is no absolute dichotomy between anti-Israel discourse and antisemitism, as Ms Kos­takid­is had contended. Anti-Israel discourse and antisemitism are neither inher­ently the same as each other nor inher­ently different to one another.
   
   
9. The overlap between them was analysed in Vorch­heimer v Tayeh [2026] VCAT 134 (26 February 2026). The Victorian Civil and Admin­is­trat­ive Tribunal had to decide whether repeated chants of “All Zionists are ter­ror­ists” by organ­isers and par­ti­cipants at a “pro-Palestine” rally in Mel­bourne’s CBD on 23 March 2025, including Hash Tayeh and Nasser Mashni, con­tra­vened the anti-racial-vili­fic­a­tion pro­vi­sions in sections 7 and 8 of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic). The applicant, Menachem Vorch­heimer, alleged that the word “Zionist” in this context was a codeword for “Jew”.
   
   
10. Her Honour Vice President My Anh Tran found in Mr Vorchheimer’s favour. Her reasoning is sum­mar­ised in the following extracts from the judgment.
    
    
    “[E]ncouraging thousands of people to chant a sim­pli­fied and absolute statement (“All Zionists are ter­ror­ists”) is conduct cal­cu­lated to incite emotional and impres­sion­ist­ic responses, rather than careful thinking. By its nature, a chant fires the emotions and encour­ages a sense of unity in its par­ti­cipants. When what is chanted is the attach­ment of a heinous label (terrorist) to an undif­fer­en­ti­ated group of people (All Zionists) it nor­m­al­ises and encour­ages extreme emotions such as hatred towards the targets of the chant.” [at 76].
    
    
    “This was an audience primed by their exper­i­ences for incite­ment to strong emotions.” [at 78]
    
    
    “There are also aspects of the language of Mr Mashni and Mr Tayeh which may have fed antisemitic view­points. A per­sist­ent theme of Mr Mashni, Mr Tayeh and other speakers is that “Zionists” are respons­ible for secretly manip­u­lat­ing gov­ern­ments, police or media. This evokes the antisemitic trope that Jews are “a world-dom­in­at­ing cabal in control of the global financial system, global media, politics”: (Jayne Jagot ‘Trying to under­stand antisemitism today’ (Speech, Sir Zelman Cowen Lecture) 5 October 2023 at p 3). Both refer to Zionists as holding a racist suprem­acist ideology, with the relevant “race” being Jewish. This evokes com­par­is­on with the racist suprem­acist ideology of the Nazis, which saw six million Jews murdered.” [at 91]
    
    
    “Mr Tayeh engaged in conduct (ini­ti­at­ing a simplist­ic chant assigning a heinous label to an undif­fer­en­ti­ated class of people) which was inher­ently likely to incite strong emotions such as hatred. As explained at the outset, ss 7 and 8 are not concerned with outlawing criticism; but rather with outlawing the incite­ment of a relevant emotion on the ground of race or religious belief or activity…” [at 111]
    
    
    For a person who hates Jews, and equates Zionists with Jews, the ordinary impact of thousands of people chanting alongside them that “All Zionists are ter­ror­ists”, is to normalise, encourage and sanction their viewpoint. In other words, it is to incite hatred against Jewish people. For other rally par­ti­cipants there is likely to have been a strong asso­ci­ation between the word “Zionists” and Jewish people. That asso­ci­ation is strengthened by the word “All”. It is also strengthened by the messaging described above which used Jewish symbols such as the Star of David; or was evocative of antisemitic tropes or Holocaust themes. [at 117 – 118]
    
    
    “In the entirety of the cir­cum­stances described above, I have concluded that the natural and ordinary effect of thousands of people united in chanting “All Zionists are ter­ror­ists” at the Rally would be to tip many rally par­ti­cipants over the threshold into hatred directed towards Jewish people.” [at 121]
    
    
11. Vice President Tran’s judgment is, with respect, notable both for its lucidity and for the absence of any agonising over whether “Zionists” in the cir­cum­stances of the case was merely a reference to adherents of a political ideology.
    
    
    The fallacy of char­ac­ter­ising Zionism as a political ideology
    
    

12. The central thesis of this paper is that the char­ac­ter­isa­tion of Zionism as a political ideology lacks rigour. A political ideology in common parlance is a col­lec­tion of ideals, prin­ciples, and beliefs that seeks to explain how human society in general has developed and how it should be ordered. Examples of political ideo­lo­gies are liberal democracy, socialism, theocracy, fascism and communism. Zionism does not seek to explain or prescribe how human society in general is or should be ordered. Zionism is the belief in the right of national self-determ­in­a­tion of the Jewish people in their historic homeland, Israel, where the Jewish people have had an enduring spiritual, religious and physical con­nec­tion for more than 3,000 years, including more than 1,000 years of national self-gov­ern­ment. The word Zionism is derived from the name of Mount Zion, which is situated at the geo­graph­ic heart of Jerusalem. ‘Zion’ was thus used over the millenia to symbolise Jerusalem, the political and religious capital of ancient and modern Israel, and also at times to refer to the entire Land of Israel.
    
    
13. Although there are many streams of Zionism, at its core it is a national inde­pend­ence movement akin to the national self-determ­in­a­tion movements of European nations in the nine­teenth and early twentieth centuries, the national lib­er­a­tion movements of colonies in the sub-continent, Asia and Africa after World War II, and the movements to restore sov­er­eignty to the nations of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The fact that each of these movements raised political demands as a means of achieving national inde­pend­ence does not make them political ideo­lo­gies. In fact, within each national self-determ­in­a­tion movement there were different streams rep­res­ent­ing competing political ideo­lo­gies.
    
    
14. The dif­fer­ence between a political ideology and a national self-determ­in­a­tion movement is no mere matter of semantics. Given that political ideo­lo­gies involve beliefs about how human society in general should be ordered, cri­ti­cisms of such beliefs per se cannot in any cir­cum­stances con­sti­tute a form of racism. However, denial of the right of a people to national self-determ­in­a­tion inev­it­ably raises the issue of racism.
    
    
15. Under inter­na­tion­al law, groups that qualify as “peoples” have the right to self-determ­in­a­tion, namely the right to freely determine their col­lect­ive political fate and form a rep­res­ent­at­ive gov­ern­ment. Although no inter­na­tion­al treaty defines the term “people” for the purposes of self-determ­in­a­tion, it is generally accepted that this clas­si­fic­a­tion entails a sub­ject­ive element, such as a common belief by members of the group that they share the same char­ac­ter­ist­ics and beliefs and thus form a common unit, as well as an objective element, such as common racial back­ground, culture, ethnicity, religion, language, and history. (Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sov­er­eignty: Judicial Under­pin­nings, 31 Denver Journal of Inter­na­tion­al Law and Policy 373, 373 – 79 (2003)).
    
    
16. In the common law world, it has long been accepted that the Jewish people meet these criteria. In Aus­trali­an law, it is the “com­bin­a­tion of shared customs, beliefs, tra­di­tions and char­ac­ter­ist­ics derived from a common or presumed common past” that con­sti­tute Jews as a race or ethnic group for the purposes of the Racial Dis­crim­in­a­tion Act: King-Ansell v Police [1979] 2 NZLR 531 at 543; Jones v Scully FCA 1080 (2 September 2002) at paras 110 – 113; Miller v Wertheim [2002] FCAFC 156) at paras 13 – 14; Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720 (1 July 2025) at para 209.
    
    
17. Inter­na­tion­al law has also recog­nised the Jewish people as a national community. On 25 April 1920, a Council of the vic­tori­ous Allied and Asso­ci­ated Powers met at San Remo and resolved that Britain be granted a mandate to govern Palestine. This included recog­ni­tion of the legit­im­acy of the Jewish people’s aspir­a­tions to recon­sti­t­ute their national home in that country: http://www.cfr.org/israel/san-remo-resolution/p15248. The San Remo res­ol­u­tion was sub­sequently enshrined in the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine on 24 July 1922: https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/232, the terms of which were preserved by Article 80 of the UN Charter after the Charter came into effect in 1945. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly resolved in favour of the British Mandate of Palestine being par­ti­tioned into “a Jewish state” and “an Arab State”: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/res181.asp. The Jewish state, Israel, was admitted as a full member State of the United Nations by General Assembly Res­ol­u­tion 273 of 11 May 1949: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/210373?ln=en&v=pdf
    
    
18. Given that history, it is clearly fal­la­cious to assert that Zionism is divorced from any con­sid­er­a­tion of “Jews as Jews”. This is so regard­less of the fact that a small minority of Jews might for their own reasons reject Zionism.
    
    
19. The right of self-determ­in­a­tion of peoples is enshrined in the UN Charter, the Inter­na­tion­al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Inter­na­tion­al Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It has been recog­nised as a principle of customary inter­na­tion­al law: Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, [1975] I.C.J. Rep. 12 (16 October). In East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) (Judgment) [1995] ICJ Rep 90 (30 June) the Inter­na­tion­al Court of Justice recog­nised the erga omnes character of the right of self-determ­in­a­tion, meaning that it is a right that the entire inter­na­tion­al community is obliged to respect.
    
    
20. It follows that the attempt to single out any par­tic­u­lar people as unworthy of or unen­titled to this basic, universal right is self-evidently dis­crim­in­at­ory against, and dehu­man­ising of, that people, and is therefore a form of racism. To the extent that “dis­par­age­ment of Zionism” entails a singling out of the Jewish people as unworthy of or unen­titled to the basic, universal right of self-determ­in­a­tion is self-evidently dis­crim­in­at­ory against, and dehu­man­ising of, Jews as a people, and is therefore antisemitic. This is fun­da­ment­ally different from political criticism of Israel’s laws and political insti­tu­tions or Israeli gov­ern­ment policies and actions.
    
    
21. The recently-developed concept of “Anti-Palestini­an Racism” includes “Failing to acknow­ledge Palestini­ans as an Indi­gen­ous people with a col­lect­ive identity, belonging and rights in relation to occupied and historic Palestine”: https://antipalestinianracism.org/. It is rank hypocrisy to char­ac­ter­ise the denial of the “col­lect­ive rights” of one people to their “historic” land as racism, but not of another.
    
    

Peter Wertheim is co-CEO of ECAJ